View of Whiteplains Plantation

View of Whiteplains Plantation
Over Head View - Taken May 8, 2011 Photo By: Phil Rainwater

Saturday, January 30, 2016

Whiteplains Announcements List - Soup-Off

 
 To: whiteplains-announcements-list@googlegroups.com
Next Saturday, February 6, @ 6:30pm is annual "soup-off" at Moore's hangar. Monies raised during this event go to Gilbert Schools to help needy children in our community. If you don't want to make a soup please come and bring dollars to cast your vote for your favorite soup. There are typically 15 different soups to try. Hopefully we will see you next Saturday.

Thanks for your support,
Mike Moore


Saturday, January 23, 2016

Whiteplains Plantation HOA Meeting 1-19-2016


Video of  Whiteplains Plantation HOA Meeting that was held in Mike & Jean Moore Hangar. Special thanks to them for hosting this years meeting.

This video covers the entire meeting for people that were unable to attend this years meeting.

Video by: Don Cook

Friday, January 15, 2016

From AOPA Training Tip

 

Training Tip: An enlightened decision

9
January 11, 2016
Light gun signals
A flight instructor and a student pilot are reviewing scenarios that could arise during a solo flight in the traffic pattern of a towered airport. “Suppose your radios fail as you are taxiing to the runway for takeoffs and landings. How would ground and tower controllers advise you that you are cleared to continue taxiing, and to take off?” the CFI asks.
The ground controller would employ a flashing green light gun signal, and the tower controller would clear the flight for takeoff with a steady green light, the student responds.
How would ATC instruct you to reverse direction after the communications failure?
The pilot would see the only light gun signal that applies just to aircraft on the ground—a flashing white light that means, “Return to starting point on airport.”
Why might ATC send you back to the ramp?
If it is a busy time at the airport, having a no-radio aircraft in the traffic pattern might not be prudent, and would raise ATC’s workload. Or the controllers might recognize that a student pilot is in command, making it wise to send the trainer back to its base to discuss the situation by phone.
What if it is the student pilot who wants to return to the ramp, but gets green lights instead? How would you decline taxi and takeoff clearances, and call off the flight? Have you discussed this scenario with your instructor?
Communicating that message would be easier said than done without preparation. Having a cell phone on board, and knowing the control tower’s number (or being able to relay your intentions through the FBO) would help tremendously. Do you know that number?
If not, you’d have to improvise, perhaps flashing the aircraft’s lights at the tower—without moving the aircraft—to express your need for new instructions.
If the tower is radar-equipped, a more last-resort means of communicating your needs might be to change your squawk code from code 7600 to 7700. That would raise a straightforward lost-comm scenario to the level of an emergency. But in making a safety judgment, you would be exercising your “final authority” as pilot in command as to the safe operation of the aircraft.
Do other, less drastic remedies come to mind?
Given the complexity of such a scenario, it’s clear that having the tower’s phone number at hand, and a way to use it, beats most alternatives.
Dan Namowitz

Dan Namowitz | Aviation Writer
Dan Namowitz is an aviation writer and flight instructor.

 

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education


Part 91 operators use of Minimum Descent Altitude as a Decision Altitude
Notice Number: NOTC6369

Part 91 operators use of Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) as a Decision Altitude (DA) 

Many navigation systems permit operators to fly non-precision approaches with GPS lateral and vertical navigation guidance. FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 18, Section 5, paragraph C073 provides guidance on how an MDA may be used as a DA when using vertical navigation (VNAV).
Operators must be authorized with a Letter of Authorization (LOA) C073 in order to use an MDA as a DA with VNAV. This information was originally published in Notice, N 8900.248, dated 12/11/13. The Notice expired 12/12/14 and the information incorporated in the above mentioned 8900.1 guidance.
Recommended Actions: Operators of aircraft should accomplish the following:
1.View FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 18, Section 5, paragraph C073 to determine if your aircraft is capable of using MDA as DA.
2.Determine if you are willing to accomplish procedures required in LOA C073.
3.Request LOA C073 from your Principal Operating Inspector at local Flight Standard District Office.
Contact: Questions or comments should be directed to Kel Christianson, Aviation Safety Inspector, AFS-470 at (202) 267-8838.
This notice is being sent to you because you selected "General Information" in your preferences on FAASafety.gov. If you wish to adjust your selections, log into https://www.faasafety.gov/Users/pub/preferences.aspx where you can update your preferences.
Invite a fellow pilot to the next WINGS Safety Seminar in your area.

Wednesday, January 13, 2016

Shaw Air Expo - May 21-22 2016

Home > Air Expo
Shaw Air Expo

Air showAir show

The Shaw Air Expo is scheduled for May 21-22, 2016.

The United States Air Force's aerial demonstration team is scheduled to bring the noise over the skies of Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina.

Commonly known as the Thunderbirds, these F-16 Fighting Falcons present a constant image of excellence in every air show they perform in and demonstrate the capabilities of both Air Force pilots and aircraft.
tabRequests 

Vendor Requests

All vendor requests for Shaw Air Expo should be directed to 803-895-4867 or charles.rupp@us.af.mil.

Air Show Requests

All air show requests involving a display or aircraft should be directed to 803-895-1052 or daniel.tindall@us.af.mil.

tabPress 

The Shaw Air Force Base point of contact for media requests is 20th Fighter Wing Public Affairs.

517 Lance Avenue, Suite 106
Shaw Air Force Base, S.C. 29152

Commerical: 803-895-2019
DSN: 965-2019
E-mail: 20fwpublicaffairs@us.af.mil

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For directions to Shaw Air Force Base, click here.


 Inside Shaw AFB

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Airmen and Family Readiness Center 20th Force Support Squadron services
Housing Office 20th Fighter Wing Legal office
20th Medical Group Health Care Services Newcomers Information
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Yes it could happen to you....


January 2016
It Could Never Happen to Me!

When ASRS Analysts screen safety incident reports, they can tag certain ones for their relevance to upcoming CALLBACK topics. Other reports can be tagged for the Editor’s “Miscellaneous” file simply because they are “interesting.” A year-end review of the Miscellaneous file found several reports that fit into the “DOH!” (“Different Or Humorous!”) category and are worth sharing.

No matter what our level of experience, there is an important lesson to be learned from these reports. No one is immune to error and, while some of these mistakes may seem rather improbable, those who think, “It could never happen to me” may be setting themselves up for embarrassment or worse. Wise aviation professionals recognize that we are all just a brief mental lapse away from one of those memorable moments we’d like to forget. Or, as a pilot stated in the first sentence of a recent report, “After years of reading incident reports and thinking, ‘How could a pilot do something so stupid?’ now I understand. I have met the moron and he is ME!”
Not a Good Friday
Obviously, mistakes attributable to lack of experience tend to happen earlier in our flying careers. One of the factors often affecting newer pilots is a tendency to focus so intently on one thing that their sense of the “big picture” is lost. An integral part of the big picture is what some old timers refer to as “headwork” or common sense. This B99 pilot may have been a little too focused on the mechanics of a checklist to step back mentally and question whether it fit the situation.
Enroute … I started to perform my required “Weekly Checks” Checklist, going through item by item. The checklist calls for the weekly fire-test; the first item is to pull both fire handles. As I pulled them I noticed a sudden loss of performance on both engines. My gauges indicated that both of them flamed out. I pushed the handles back and started to troubleshoot. I determined that my right engine was still operational. Meanwhile, the aircraft was losing altitude but it was under control. I advised ATC about my situation and they told me there was an airport ten miles away along my route.… Being a new pilot on this airplane, under these circumstances I decided the best course of action was to secure the inoperative engine and land as soon as possible. Having my right engine operational, I was able to stabilize the airplane and started my VFR descent. I completed my Emergency Checklist and then performed a safe single engine landing.

I am a new pilot on this airplane, having just completed my upgrade training one week ago. During the flight training, this part of the checklist was never mentioned and the checklist was not available in the training aircraft. On the checklist, the fire test appears to be among the inflight test items. This situation was the result of me following the checklist that I believed I was supposed to perform. Had I received the proper training, I am sure this situation could have been avoided.
Push the “Right” Pedal
The more this Maule M7 Pilot corrected a left yaw with right rudder, the more trouble he had controlling the aircraft. When you think you’re doing the right thing, but get the wrong result, it’s time to do some troubleshooting.
I was flying … at 11,000 feet on an IFR flight plan. My autopilot disconnected and revealed an out-of-trim condition which caused the aircraft to yaw to the left. I had stretched my right leg to the right of the cockpit for comfort. When the aircraft yawed, I instinctively pressed my right foot on the rudder pedal. This caused the aircraft to yaw even more to the left, requiring full right aileron to keep from rolling inverted. I turned the autopilot off and released the rudder trim with no effect. I also reduced power and lowered the nose to get better control, advising ATC that I was turning and descending with a flight control problem. ATC advised me that [an airport] was ahead about ten miles.… As I continued to troubleshoot, I noticed that my right foot was pressing on the copilot left rudder pedal instead of the pilot right rudder pedal. As soon as I got my foot on the correct rudder pedal, I was able to control the aircraft and advised ATC. I continued the flight.
Climb to Increase Airspeed (?!)
A regular pattern of observation that includes all of the essential flight instruments is the essence of a good instrument scan. To some extent, the scan starts on the takeoff roll and, as this ERJ-145 Pilot learned, fixation on one instrument can disrupt the scan and lead to an embarrassing sequence of events.
On the takeoff roll, after calling out, “Thrust set,” I scanned the EICAS engine indications, and then I fixated on the altimeter, confusing it with the airspeed indicator. When the numbers on the altimeter dial did not increase during the takeoff roll, I mistakenly believed it was a stuck airspeed indication and called for an aborted takeoff. The Captain aborted the takeoff and we taxied to a location where we could talk to maintenance. As I was explaining to the Captain what I had seen, I realized my mistake. I had confused the Altimeter indication with the Airspeed. There were no problems with the aircraft and we completed the flight safely.
Bad Vibrations
Traffic and weather distractions after takeoff disrupted an A320 Flight Crew’s normal procedures to the point where the obvious became obscure. As the Captain noted, their experience level led them directly to troubleshooting. You can’t know too much about aviation, but sometimes you can “overthink” a simple problem.
We were focused on avoiding thunderstorms in the departure corridor. Immediately after takeoff we requested a right turn from Departure. We also remained vigilant of the [reported traffic]. There was now another concentrated area of weather directly ahead. I was trying to break into the congested Departure frequency for a turn on course, which would provide adequate weather clearance. This took a couple minutes and dominated our attention.

I noticed a slight airframe rumbling, but thought it might be the landing lights which were still extended. Once we were given the turn on course and accelerated to 250 knots, we both started to focus on the increasing noise and vibration. I raised the landing lights with very little improvement. We completely concentrated on things that might be wrong with the airplane and searched through numerous system ECAM pages for answers. Everything appeared normal and all symbols were green (including the large green landing gear DOWN and LOCKED symbols which were as we always see them… on the ground. But the gear doors I concentrated on were in fact UP and green), so we started hypothesizing about abnormal things that might be wrong with the jet. Things like a missing engine cowl, flap track fairings, gear doors open, flight controls out of position. We continued north as we attempted troubleshooting and began to think about diverting. We asked the Lead Flight Attendant to take a look at the wings, etc. and report back any anomalies. He found nothing unusual. I asked the First Officer to keep the speed back at 210 knots and to level off at 15,000 feet to remain in a safe speed and altitude range in case something was extended and to protect the airframe. I attempted a radio patch through Dispatch to include Maintenance. The reception was poor and we never spoke with Maintenance. We decided to continue communications through ACARS.

Enough troubleshooting time had passed that I decided we needed to get the plane on the ground safely. I instructed the First Officer to coordinate landing at the divert airport while I briefed the Lead Flight Attendant and then performed the Airframe Vibration Checklist.... As the First Officer flew the visual approach he called for “Gear Down, Landing Checklist.” It then became immediately clear that our “problem” was that the landing gear had never been retracted. We continued to a landing without incident since there was not enough time to verify adequate fuel to continue to [our destination].

I attribute this error to saturation with weather and traffic avoidance on departure followed by a lack of performing normal climb out procedures for the same reason.… When we were handed off to Departure we focused intently on clearing traffic and weather on a very congested frequency. Obviously, I did not raise the gear and after raising the flaps we had already completed our 90-degree right turn and were headed toward the thunderstorm area directly ahead. My attention was primarily on trying to break into the busy Departure Control frequency for an immediate clearance north away from the weather. This dominated our attention and I believe I never accomplished the After Takeoff Checklist since it’s simply so out of sequence climbing out of approximately five or six thousand feet.

Between us, [the First Officer and I] have around 30,000 flight hours, and about eight years’ experience each in the Airbus. I believe this is an important contributing factor since I have never experienced even a delayed gear retraction on takeoff. It’s such an unusual thing that we simply didn’t consider it. As we scrolled through ECAM system pages and other troubleshooting attempts/hypotheses, we never considered such a simple error. Our experience level led us directly to troubleshooting a problem rather than looking for the obvious solution. It’s the most embarrassing event of my flying career.

This flight encountered a confluence of operational challenges as well as human factors issues which resulted in a sub-par performance. It’s not like we lacked understanding of landing gear panel or ECAM symbols. I simply allowed my focus on weather and aircraft avoidance to lead to my neglect of basics. I failed to raise the landing gear and perform the After Takeoff Checklist properly since we were so far past the normal flight sequence to accomplish it while concentrating on immediate safety of flight procedures.… I am glad the company allowed us to continue the flight since I personally wanted to get back in the saddle and put this behind us.
ASRS Database Online
The ASRS Database is a rich source of information for policy development, research, training, and more.
CALLBACK Issue 432
ASRS Online Resources
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Special Studies
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
November 2015
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots
4,591
General Aviation Pilots
1,047
Flight Attendants
507
Controllers
434
Military/Other
252
Dispatchers
206
Mechanics
171
TOTAL
7,208
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NOTE TO READERS:     Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Issue 432



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